Category Archives: Interpretation
Bilika Simamba, ‘The Plain Meaning Rule: A Quibble about Nomenclature and a Lot More’
ABSTRACT In the Cayman Islands, a British Overseas Territory, the proper understanding of the plain meaning rule (or literal rule) of statutory interpretation remains unclear. In its most basic iteration, the rule states that, where a statute is clear and unambiguous, the words must be given their natural and ordinary signification; there is no room […]
‘Legal Theory Lexicon: Textualism’
“One of the most important topics in legal theory is ‘legal interpretation’, which deals with the derivation of meaning from legal texts. Of course, legal interpretation is a very large topic, with several different dimensions and approaches. This post will focus on ‘textualism’, and provide some introductory ideas about interpretive theory in general …” (more) […]
Kevin Tobia, ‘Dueling Dictionaries and Clashing Corpora’
ABSTRACT Judges increasingly look to corpus linguistic tools in legal interpretation, as scholars advance corpus linguistics arguments about statutory and constitutional language. Corpus linguistics is sometimes offered as a preferred interpretive tool, avoiding the pitfalls of dueling canons or cherry-picked dictionary definitions. However, this short essay proposes, legal corpus linguistic tools are unlikely to resolve […]
Fareed Moosa, ‘Interpretation of Wills – Does the Endumeni Case Apply?’
ABSTRACT This article argues that the general approach to documentary interpretation articulated in Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 4 SA 593 (SCA) (Endumeni) applies also to the interpretation of wills, subject to adaptation for context. It is argued that interpretation of wills and the application of an interpretation to a particular […]
Bill Watson, ‘Literalism in Statutory Interpretation: What Is It and What Is Wrong with It?’
“In two recent decisions – Bostock v Clayton County and Niz-Chavez v Garland – a majority of the Supreme Court claimed to apply a textualist approach to statutory interpretation, and a dissent charged the majority with applying ‘literalism’ instead. But what is literalism and what, if anything, is wrong with it? This Essay borrows a […]
Evan Zoldan, ‘Searching for Law in All the Wrong Places’
ABSTRACT In ‘The Corpus and the Critics’, Lee and Mouritsen reaffirm their commitment to using corpus linguistics tools in order to interpret legal language. They also respond to critics of their enterprise, both by restating some of their previous positions and also by making some important modifications in light of this criticism. Some of Lee […]
‘Legal Interpretation’
“Legal interpretation involves scrutinizing legal texts such as the texts of statutes, constitutions, contracts, and wills. This chapter introduces the foundational question of what legal interpretation, by its nature, seeks – and competing answers to that question. It goes on to canvas leading substantive theories of legal interpretation and examines in greater depth a few […]
Rebecca Kysar, ‘Interpreting by the Rules’
ABSTRACT A promising new school of statutory interpretation has emerged that tries to wed the work of Congress with that of the courts by tying interpretation to congressional process. The primary challenge to this process-based interpretive approach is the difficulty in reconstructing the legislative process. Scholars have proposed leveraging Congress’s procedural frameworks and rules as […]
Jennejohn, Nelson and Núñez, ‘Hidden Bias in Empirical Textualism’
ABSTRACT A new interpretive technique called ‘corpus linguistics’ has exploded in use over the past five years from state supreme courts and federal courts of appeals to the US Supreme Court. Corpus linguistics involves searching a large database, or corpus, of text to identify patterns in the way in which a certain term is used […]
Ross Carter, ‘Interpretation Acts – Are They, and (How) Do They Make for, Great Law?’
ABSTRACT The paper considers the purposes and evolution of Interpretation Acts, including the following points: how, as default law, they inform and interact with other legislation; their scope as, and interaction with other, interpretation law (including links with interpretation legislation in related jurisdictions); ways they can stop being, or fail to be, great law (that […]