ABSTRACT
Why are impartial institutions such as formalized property rights so important for the emergence of impersonal trade? Previous literature has stressed the role of such institutions in providing third-party enforcement to shield strangers from locals’ opportunism. We document the existence of a second mechanism based on the role of formalized property rights in inducing respect for the property of strangers, regardless of enforcement. Ten years after the randomized introduction of formal property rights across rural Benin, we conducted a taking-dictator-game experiment in which participants could appropriate the endowment of an anonymous stranger from a different village. Even if enforcement institutions are absent and peer effects are silenced by design, participants from villages where the reform was implemented took significantly less than those in control villages. We further give consideration to several possible transmission channels and discuss their plausibility.
Fabbri, Marco and Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe and Rizzolli, Matteo, Strangers’ Property (January 5, 2024). Forthcoming: Journal of Law, Economics and Organizations, Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No 2023-44; Amsterdam Center for Law and Economics Working Paper No 2023-14.
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