‘Novel Beings’: special number of Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics

Novel Beings: Moral Status and Regulation (David Lawrence and Sarah Morley)

Regulating the Tyrell Corporation: the Emergence of Novel Beings (David R Lawrence and Sarah Morley)

Artificial Moral Responsibility: How We Can and Cannot Hold Machines Responsible (Daniel W Tigard)

The Mandatory Ontology of Robot Responsibility (Marc Champagne)

Response: Artificial Agents in Natural Moral Communities: A Brief Clarification (Daniel W Tigard)

Response: How Could We Know When a Robot was a Moral Patient? (Henry Shevlin)

Commentary: What Matters for Moral Status: Behavioral or Cognitive Equivalence? (John Danaher)

Commentary: What Do We Owe to Novel Synthetic Beings and How Can We Be Sure? (Alex McKeown)

Commentary: The Moral Status of Cognitively Enhanced Monkeys and Other Novel Beings (Gardar Arnason)

Commentary: The Desirability of Legal Rights for Novel Beings (Joshua Jowitt)

Commentary: Moral Status for Malware! The Difficulty of Defining Advanced Artificial Intelligence (Miranda Mowbray)

Commentary: Patents, Governance and Control: Ethics and the Patentability of Novel Beings and Advanced Biotechnologies in Europe (Aisling McMahon)

Commentary: Novel Beings and Assisted Nonexistence (Isra Black)


Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics volume 30 – issue 3 – July 2021

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