Jamie Buckland, ‘Agent-Relativity and the Status of Deontological Restrictions’

“There is a familiar distinction in moral philosophy between deontological and consequentialist normative theories. Deontological theories place a significant emphasis on the idea that what matters, morally, is that individual agents perform or refrain from performing certain action-types, rather than promoting the occurrence, or non-occurrence of these action-types more generally. More specifically, a deontologist will posit the existence of various deontological constraints (or side-constraints) that prohibit (deontological restrictions), require (deontological obligations), or permit (deontological permissions) the performance of particular action-types because they are inherently right or wrong, over and above a consequentialist requirement to minimise or maximise the occurrence of those action-types because of ‘the Good’ the occurrence or non-occurrence of those action-types brings about (presuming such requirements even exist) …” (more)

Jamie Buckland, ‘Agent-Relativity and the Status of Deontological Restrictions’, Journal of Value Inquiry (2021), https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-021-09823-z. Published: 16 April 2021.

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