Monthly Archives: June, 2019

Steven Wilf, ‘What Is Property’s Fourth Estate – Cultural Property and the Fiduciary Idea’

ABSTRACT Cultural property is a pastiche of the other property regimes. Like real property, there is an implicit assumption that the thing itself, the res, is unique – and not a fungible good in which proprietary rights might be easily exchanged for money. This incommensurability makes other kinds of legal relief, like pecuniary relief, more […]

Asaf Raz, ‘A Purpose-Based Theory of Corporate Law’

ABSTRACT … After an introduction, Part 2 of the Article discusses in great detail the five phenomena that define corporate law: the corporation’s purpose, personhood, stakeholders, residual claimants and fiduciaries. As this Article explains, the structure of corporate law places certain boundaries on what our normative analysis can do: for example, due to corporate law’s […]

‘Jurisdiction, the GDPR and Brussels I’

“How is jurisdiction determined in a claim for breach of the GDPR? We know the rule in Article 79(2) GPDR. But how does that interplay with the ordinary private international law rules of jurisdiction, set out in Brussels I Recast Regulation: Regulation (EU) 1215/2012? What about where the controller seeks to rely on a jurisdiction […]

‘Out now: German Journal of Chinese Law volume 26 no 1 (2019) – Comparative Views on Freedom of Contract’

“In July 2018, Professors Claudia Schubert (then University of Bochum, now Hamburg), Yuanshi Bu and Jan von Hein (both University of Freiburg) organised a comparative, Chinese-German symposium on the recent codification of the general principles of Chinese private law and their implications for freedom of contract (including choice of law) in Freiburg. The contributions to […]

Ilanah Simon Fhima, ‘The Public Domain’

ABSTRACT This article explores whether it is possible to identify and delineate the public domain in intellectual property law. The article begins with a review of existing IP scholarship on the public domain. Identifying that the prevailing model of the public domain relies upon analogies to the commons, it questions how well a model based […]

‘Can you be liable for defamation for what other people write on your Facebook page? Australian court says: maybe’

“When you go online and write something nasty about a person, or even a small business, you risk being sued for defamation. But if someone else goes online and writes something nasty about a person on your social media page, can you be held liable even though you didn’t write it? Depending on who you […]

British Columbia Law Institute, ‘Report on Common Property, Land Titles, and Fundamental Changes for Stratas’

ABSTRACT The British Columbia Law Institute’s Report on Common Property, Land Titles, and Fundamental Changes for Stratas covers three subjects that each have a major bearing on the nature of strata properties (as condominiums are known in British Columbia) as interests in land. The report’s subjects crop up at crucial moments in a strata property’s […]

Zamir and Yair, ‘Deliberate Ignorance and the Law’

ABSTRACT This paper offers a bird’s-eye view of existing legal doctrines and institutions that overcome or foster deliberate ignorance, critically assesses these doctrines and institutions, and considers extensions thereof. The first part of the paper focuses on three legal means of discouraging deliberate ignorance: (1) subjecting people who could have acquired the relevant information to […]

Michael Blumm, ‘A Dozen Landmark Nuisance Cases and Their Environmental Significance’

ABSTRACT … This paper traces the evolution of nuisance law through examining a dozen landmark cases. It suggests that where it is not federally displaced or preempted by state statutes, nuisance law remains a viable cause of action for injured landowners, particularly where the issue is left to juries. Given the hostility of the Supreme […]

Lauren Scholz, ‘Privacy Remedies’

ABSTRACT When consumers sue companies for privacy-intrusive practices, they are often unsuccessful. Many cases fail in federal court at the motion to dismiss phase because the plaintiff has not shown the privacy infringement has caused her concrete harm. This is a symptom of a broader issue: the failure of courts and commentators to describe the […]