Category Archives: Deontology and Moral Responsibility

Verdicchio and Perin, ‘When Doctors and AI Interact: on Human Responsibility for Artificial Risks’

ABSTRACT A discussion concerning whether to conceive Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems as responsible moral entities, also known as ‘artificial moral agents’ (AMAs), has been going on for some time. In this regard, we argue that the notion of ‘moral agency’ is to be attributed only to humans based on their autonomy and sentience, which AI […]

van Domselaar and De Bock, ‘The Case of David vs Goliath. On Legal Ethics and Corporate Lawyering in Large Scale Civil Liability Cases’

ABSTRACT Large corporations contribute to wealth and make an important contribution to economies. At the same time, their business operations and products form a serious threat to the rights of large groups of citizens, be it their right to health, to housing, a minimum wage, occupational safety, privacy, environment, to financial stability or to equality […]

Andrew Jordan, ‘Uniformity and Multiplicity in Contract Law: Some Reflections on the Morality of Promises’

ABSTRACT This article engages a recent debate in contract theory concerning whether we should embrace a uniform contract law, or whether we should instead adopt different legal rules for different contracting relationships. A common assumption in the literature is that grounding contract in promissory morality would lead to the former. After all, the thinking goes, […]

Nicholas McBride, ‘Are There Any Moral Duties?’

ABSTRACT This is a substantially expanded version of a paper that will appear in a collection of essays in honour of John Gardner’s contribution to thinking about private law. The idea that there are such things as moral duties was central to John’s thought about private law. This paper suggests that we have reason to […]

Nicolas Cornell, ‘Looking and Seeing’

ABSTRACT Negligence resides at the boundaries of ethics and perception. Consider a typical case: a driver fails to see an object in the road and causes an accident. In both law and moral life, we routinely hold people accountable for such failures. It is tempting to cast such failures in terms of a breach of […]

Alexandra Trofimov, ‘Negligence is not ignorance’

ABSTRACT Recent interest in the epistemic condition on moral responsibility has raised a new challenge to the view that persons are directly responsible for negligent conduct. According to an influential argument, the epistemic condition on responsibility requires genuine, clear eyed akrasia. All other kinds of wrongdoing, including negligence, constitute ignorant wrongdoing. My aim in this […]

Flanagan, de Almeida, Struchiner and Hannikainen, ‘Moral Appraisals Guide Intuitive Legal Determinations’

ABSTRACT Socialization demands the capacity to observe a plethora of private, legal, and institutional rules. To accomplish this, individuals must grasp rules’ meaning and infer the class of conduct each proscribes. Yet this basic account neglects important nuance in the way we reason about complex cases in which a rule’s literal or textualist interpretation conflicts […]

Critical Legal Thinking on Scott Veitch’s Obligations: New Trajectories in Law

Rights, Obligations and Torture: On Veitch’s Obligations (Julen Etxabe, 14 December) The Structures and Subjects of Obligation: On Veitch’s Obligation (Matt Stone, 15 December) Eco-Legal Bonds: On Veitch’s Obligations (Margaret Davies, 16 December) On Veitch’s Obligations (Stacy Douglas, 17 December) A Reply – Obligations: New Trajectories in Law (Scott Veitch, 20 December)

Vivencio Ballano, ‘Analyzing the Morality of Owning and Suspending Patent Rights for COVID-19 Vaccines in the Light of Catholic Social Teaching’

ABSTRACT Using the Roman Catholic Church’s set of moral principles on social concerns called Catholic social teaching (CST) and utilizing some secondary data and scientific research literature, this article examines the morality of India and South Africa’s request to the World Trade Organization (WTO) to temporarily suspend the property rights and patents of top pharmaceutical […]

Dori Kimel, ‘The Next Best Thing To a Promise’

ABSTRACT What does the promisor owe the promisee when a promise is broken? Some writers have argued that the same reparative obligation – ‘next-best performance’ – arises, at least by default, in all such cases, no matter what kind of promise has been broken, what background relationship there is between promisor and promisee, and what […]