Category Archives: Deontology and Moral Responsibility

Licht and Brülde, ‘On Defining “Reliance” and “Trust”: Purposes, Conditions of Adequacy, and New Definitions’

ABSTRACT Trust is often perceived as having great value. For example, there is a strong belief that trust will bring different sorts of public goods and help us preserve common resources. A related concept which is just as important, but perhaps not explicitly discussed to the same extent as ‘trust’, is ‘reliance’ or ‘confidence’. To […]

Bruce Palmer, ‘What Is an Unjust Act’

ABSTRACT This essay proposes an operational or functional definition of an unjust act, an objective definition that would allow one to identify an unjust act across societies and cultures. It distinguishes between ‘injustice’ and a ‘just act’, justice being defined at least in part subjectively, unlike the proposed operational definition of an unjust act. It […]

Ko Hasegawa, ‘Interactive Reason in Law’

ABSTRACT This paper, which is the original draft of the article already published in 2017, explicates more about the article, exploring the complex working of reason in law and its interrelationship to the emotion of fairness. Hasegawa, Ko, Interactive Reason in Law (2017). Law, Reason and Emotion (Cambridge UP, 2017).

Matthieu Queloz, ‘The self-effacing functionality of blame’

ABSTRACT This paper puts forward an account of blame combining two ideas that are usually set up against each other: that blame performs an important function, and that blame is justified by the moral reasons making people blameworthy rather than by its functionality. The paper argues that blame could not have developed in a purely […]

Courtney Cox, ‘Legitimizing Lies’

ABSTRACT Lies are everywhere today. This scourge of misinformation raises difficult questions about how the law can and should respond to falsehoods. Legal discourse has traditionally focused on the law’s choice between penalizing and tolerating lying. But this traditional framing vastly oversimplifies the law’s actual and potential responses. Using trade secrets as a case study, […]

Bastian Steuwer, ‘Contractualism, Complaints, and Risk’

ABSTRACT How should contractualists assess the permissibility of risky actions? Both main views on the question, ex ante and ex post, fail to distinguish between different kinds of risk. In this article, I argue that this overlooks a third alternative that I call ‘objective ex ante contractualism’. Objective ex ante substitutes discounting complaints by epistemic […]

Andrew Halpin, ‘No-Right and its Correlative’

ABSTRACT This article aims to dispel the confusion over no-right by drawing attention to three straightforward points, and by examining a neglected source of complexity. The former embrace the practical significance of a no-right within Hohfeld’s scheme; the important difference between the practical significance of a normative position and the theoretical status of the concept […]

Stefan Riedener, ‘Don’t make a fetish of faults: a vindication of moral luck’

ABSTRACT Is it appropriate to blame people unequally if the only difference between them was a matter of luck? Suppose Alice would drive recklessly if she could, Belen drove recklessly but didn’t harm anyone, and Cleo drove recklessly and killed a child. Luck-advocates emphasize that in real life we do blame such agents very unequally. […]

‘Medieval Theories of Conscience’

“The question of what role the human mind plays in moral behaviour – or the study of moral psychology – has been a fruitful area of research in medieval philosophy since at least the early to mid-1990s. Since then scholars have done much to illuminate medieval contributions to such perennial topics as the freedom of […]

Just Published: Wortgebunden – Zur Verbindlichkeit von Versprechen in Recht und Literatur (Albers, Harst and Kaesling eds)

Die Selbstbindung durch das gegebene Wort ist eine Grundbedingung des gesellschaftlichen Lebens. Das Versprechen wirkt in der Moral, im Recht, aber auch in der Liebe. Es gewährt daher einen Blick auf das Verhältnis dieser verschiedenen Formen sozialer Verbindlichkeit zueinander. Weil das Versprechen seine eigene Wirkung aber nie gewährleisten kann, sondern immer voraussetzen muss, wirft es […]