Category Archives: Deontology and Moral Responsibility

Just Published: Wortgebunden – Zur Verbindlichkeit von Versprechen in Recht und Literatur (Albers, Harst and Kaesling eds)

Die Selbstbindung durch das gegebene Wort ist eine Grundbedingung des gesellschaftlichen Lebens. Das Versprechen wirkt in der Moral, im Recht, aber auch in der Liebe. Es gewährt daher einen Blick auf das Verhältnis dieser verschiedenen Formen sozialer Verbindlichkeit zueinander. Weil das Versprechen seine eigene Wirkung aber nie gewährleisten kann, sondern immer voraussetzen muss, wirft es […]

Jay Spitzley, ‘The Future of Moral Responsibility and Desert’

ABSTRACT Most contemporary accounts of moral responsibility take desert to play a central role in the nature of moral responsibility. It is also assumed that desert is a backward-looking concept that is not directly derivable from any forward-looking or consequentialist considerations, such as whether blaming an agent would deter the agent from performing similar bad […]

Lauritz Aastrup Munch, ‘How Privacy Rights Engender Direct Doxastic Duties’

INTRODUCTION While many believe in the existence of a moral right to privacy, there is no clear-cut agreement in the literature regarding the precise duties engendered by this right. However, most would likely grant the following: The right to privacy sometimes requires of us that we do not engage in certain forms of snooping, since […]

Alexander Heape, ‘Promises, obligation, and reliance’

INTRODUCTION Most of us believe that people are obligated to keep their promises. There are many views of why this is. Most contemporary accounts agree that it is because promises somehow establish a normatively significant relation between two people: the person who gives the promise (the promisor) and the person who receives it (the promisee). […]

‘Unwrapping the consent box: The CJEU Judgment in the Orange Romania Case’

“On 11 November 2020, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) issued its decision in the case Orange Romania SA v The Romanian National Supervisory Authority for the Processing of Personal Data (Romanian DPA). This decision significantly raises the standards of consent, as we will explain in this article. It will be a […]

‘Legal Theory Lexicon: Normativity, Morality, and Ethics’

“In ordinary English, the words we frequently use words like ‘normative’, ‘moral’, and ‘ethical’ in loose and imprecise ways. Sometimes, these terms are used interchangeably, and so one could say that a ‘normative argument’ is an ‘ethical argument’ and that both of those phrases are equivalent to ‘moral argument’. There is nothing wrong these usages […]

Jeffrey Helmreich, ‘Accepting Forgiveness’

ABSTRACT Forgiving wrongdoers who neither apologized, nor sought to make amends in any way, is controversial. Even defenders of the practice agree with critics that such ‘unilateral’ forgiveness involves giving up on the meaningful redress that victims otherwise justifiably demand from their wrongdoers: apology, reparations, repentance, and so on. Against that view, I argue here […]

‘Deontological Ethics’

“The word deontology derives from the Greek words for duty (deon) and science (or study) of (logos). In contemporary moral philosophy, deontology is one of those kinds of normative theories regarding which choices are morally required, forbidden, or permitted. In other words, deontology falls within the domain of moral theories that guide and assess our […]

Leonhard Menges, ‘A Defense of Privacy as Control’

ABSTRACT Even though the idea that privacy is some kind of control is often presented as the standard view on privacy, there are powerful objections against it. The aim of this paper is to defend the control account of privacy against some particularly pressing challenges by proposing a new way to understand the relevant kind […]

Victor Mardellat, ‘Contractualism and the paradox of deontology’

ABSTRACT Scanlonian contractualism rejects the consequentialist assumptions about morality, value, and rationality in virtue of which deontological constraints appear paradoxical. And yet, Jeffrey Brand-Ballard and Robert Shaver have claimed that it cannot succeed in defending the said restrictions. That is because they see Scanlon’s tie-breaking argument as threatening to justify aggregation in paradox of deontology […]