Category Archives: Deontology and Moral Responsibility

Leonhard Menges, ‘A Defense of Privacy as Control’

ABSTRACT Even though the idea that privacy is some kind of control is often presented as the standard view on privacy, there are powerful objections against it. The aim of this paper is to defend the control account of privacy against some particularly pressing challenges by proposing a new way to understand the relevant kind […]

Victor Mardellat, ‘Contractualism and the paradox of deontology’

ABSTRACT Scanlonian contractualism rejects the consequentialist assumptions about morality, value, and rationality in virtue of which deontological constraints appear paradoxical. And yet, Jeffrey Brand-Ballard and Robert Shaver have claimed that it cannot succeed in defending the said restrictions. That is because they see Scanlon’s tie-breaking argument as threatening to justify aggregation in paradox of deontology […]

Pauline Kleingeld, ‘How to Use Someone “Merely as a Means”’

ABSTRACT The prohibition on using others ‘merely as means’ is one of the best-known and most influential elements of Immanuel Kant’s moral theory. But it is widely regarded as impossible to specify with precision the conditions under which this prohibition is violated. On the basis of a re-examination of Kant’s texts, the article develops a […]


“Trust is important, but it is also dangerous. It is important because it allows us to depend on others – for love, for advice, for help with our plumbing, or what have you – especially when we know that no outside force compels them to give us these things. But trust also involves the risk […]

Susanne Burri, ‘Morally Permissible Risk Imposition and Liability to Defensive Harm’

ABSTRACT This paper examines whether an agent becomes liable to defensive harm by engaging in a morally permissible but foreseeably risk-imposing activity that subsequently threatens objectively unjustified harm. It first clarifies the notion of a foreseeably risk-imposing activity by proposing that an activity should count as foreseeably risk-imposing if an agent may morally permissibly perform […]

Victor Tadros, ‘Distributing Responsibility’

INTRODUCTION A widespread view in moral, legal, and political philosophy, as well as in public discourse, is that responsibility makes a difference to the fair allocation or distribution of things that are valuable or disvaluable independently of responsibility. For example, the fairness of punishing a person for wrongdoing varies with her responsibility for wrongdoing; the […]

‘Deontic Logic and the Philosophy of Law’

“It is curious that Anglophone philosophers of law (many of whom have had some training in logic in conjunction with the classwork required for a PhD) ignore deontic logic – the branch of logic that deals with propositions that employ normative concepts like obligation and permission. The point is not that deontic logic can answer […]

‘Taking Utilitarianism Seriously’

Christopher Woodard, Taking Utilitarianism Seriously, Oxford University Press, 2019, 244pp, $65.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780198732624. Christopher Woodard sets himself a difficult task here. Utilitarian theories are a subset of consequentialist theories, but even many of Woodard’s fellow consequentialists take themselves to have compelling reasons to reject certain commitments distinctive of utilitarian forms of consequentialism. They have […]

Recently published: Civil Wrongs and Justice in Private Law (Miller and Oberdiek eds)

Introduction (Paul B Miller and John Oberdiek) Chapter 1: The Roles of Rights (David Owens) Chapter 2: Purely Formal Wrongs (Liam B Murphy) Chapter 3: The Relevance of Wrongs (Andrew S Gold) Chapter 4: The Remainder: Deserting Private Wrongs? (Ori Herstein) Chapter 5: Civil Wrongs and Civil Procedure (Matthew A Shapiro) Chapter 6: Losing the […]

Timmermann and Viebahn, ‘To lie or to mislead?’

ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is to argue that lying differs from mere misleading in a way that can be morally relevant: liars commit themselves to something they believe to be false, while misleaders avoid such commitment, and this difference can make a moral difference. Even holding all else fixed, a lie can therefore […]