ABSTRACT
This paper discusses ways in which the Kantian account of private law might be more capacious than some of its critics believe it to be and identifies more precisely the reasons that Kant’s system excludes from bearing on private rights. The development of Weinrib’s conception of private law in Reciprocal Freedom clarifies that certain policy reasons and some reasons that bear asymmetrically on the right-bearer and duty-holder can still play a role in a Kantian account of private law. This follows from the sequential nature of the Kantian argument and, in particular, from the three ways in which the normativity of the first stage bears on the normativity within the civil condition. With that in place, it is possible to identify more precisely the types of reasons that cannot be bought into the Kantian fold and, consequently, to gain clarity on the argumentative burdens that Kantians need to discharge.
Claudio Michelon, How capacious is the Kantian system of rights?, Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence (2025).
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