ABSTRACT
Technology creates demarcation problems for law, with legal agents existing in a constant state of in-betweenness. Digital and biotechnologies challenge legal definitions by changing our understanding of what constitutes a ‘person’ and what constitutes a ‘thing’. This similarly affects the boundaries between inner–outer, personhood–property, and subject–object distinctions. The result is a plethora of legal problems, as modern European private law theories are built upon these dualisms. For instance, the integration of technology with human minds disturbs the liberal foundations of personhood. Human–machine interactions challenge our concept of self, as technology becomes integral to both personal identity and how individuals experience the world. Traditional understandings of personality, property, privacy, and freedom prove inadequate when confronted with liminal categories such as human–machine symbioses and the figure of the ‘hacker’. However, this challenge is not unprecedented; European legal history offers numerous examples demonstrating that these boundaries were never truly stable. A key illustration is found in Roman law, where jurists developed a hybrid conception of subjectivity to address the practical legal problems of their era. This paper therefore examines neurotechnology, with particular attention to the figure of the hacker, to analyse the ontology of modern boundaries in private law.
Talya Deibel, Demarcation problems in law and neurotechnology: persons, cyborgs and neurohackers, International Review of Law, Computers & Technology. Published online: 17 February 2025.
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