Helland and Klerman, ‘Contingent Fees and Access to Justice’

ABSTRACT
Using a unique dataset from New York City, this article shows that contingent fees seem to have, at least partly, solved the access-to-justice problem in tort litigation. People in poorer zip codes, in fact, make legal claims at a higher rate than those in wealthier areas. This greater propensity to seek and achieve legal redress is partly explained by the fact that poor people are more likely to be injured. In addition, the disparity between rich and poor manifests itself solely in smaller claims. For larger claims, rich and poor make claims at roughly the same rate. African Americans and Hispanics also make claims at a higher rate than whites, and this difference also attenuates when one controls for accident rates or focuses on larger claims.

Helland, Eric A and Klerman, Daniel M, Contingent Fees and Access to Justice (January 13, 2025), Washington University Law Review Online, volume 102; USC CLASS Research Paper No 2503.

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