ABSTRACT
This paper engages with the longstanding debate over whether being exposed to a risk of harm amounts to harm itself (what I call ‘risk-harm’). The dominant view has been that those exposed to risks of harm do not suffer harm. In this paper, I defend the widely unpopular subjectivist account of risk-harm – according to which those exposed to unwanted risks of harm can suffer harm – against prominent objections that have been levied against it. The first section sets out to renew and strengthen the appeal of the account in light of recent developments in the surrounding literature. The second section defends the account against arguably its most formidable objection, namely the claim that there is no such thing as risk-harm. The third section wraps up by parrying some prominent general objections, which highlight potentially undesirable upshots to accepting the existence of risk-harm.
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Yan Kai Zhou, Undesirably risky affairs: resuscitating the desire-based approach to risk as harm, Journal of Legal Philosophy, volume 49, issue 2, 97-118. Published: 9 October 2024.
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