ABSTRACT
Luigino Bruni and Robert Sugden have provided a normative defense of markets from a virtue ethics perspective. They interpret market exchange as being a practice in the sense of Alasdair MacIntyre. For Bruni and Sugden, the telos of a market is mutual benefit and a market virtue is a character trait or disposition that contributes to the realization of this benefit. They regard market virtues as embodying a moral attitude towards market interactions that is characterized by reciprocity. For MacIntyre, this is a partial account of a virtue. To qualify as a virtue, it is also necessary that it contributes to the good of an individual’s life taken as a whole and to the social tradition in which both practices and individuals are embedded. We adopt MacIntye’s understanding of a virtue and consider the extent to which Bruni and Sugden’s account of market virtues is compatible with respecting the fundamental human good of dignity in Kant’s sense of this term.
Calderón Gómez, Luís Carlos and Talisse, Robert B. and Weymark, John A, Market Virtues and Respect for Human Dignity (June 22, 2024), Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper No 2024-25; in R Gotoh (ed), Dignity, Freedom and Justice (2024).
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