Category Archives: Law and Economics

James Stern, ‘What is the Right to Exclude and Why Does It Matter?’

Abstract The ‘right to exclude’ is commonly said to be a central element of the formal structure of property, and some relatively sweeping claims have been made about its role and effect. This chapter seeks to provide a clearer understanding of the right to exclude and its relationship to property. First, it sets out a […]

Alexandra Lahav, ‘Mass Tort Class Actions – Past, Present, And Future’

Introduction … For tort law and, consequently, for the procedural law that effectuates it, that future seemed imminent but never arrived. This Essay tells the story in three parts. The first part describes the growth of three phenomena that are relevant to understanding the idea of a mass tort class action: the advent of modern […]

D’Agostino and Lisciandra, ‘Binding and Non-Binding Contracts: A Theoretical Appraisal’

Abstract The article investigates the equilibrium conditions in the choice between legally binding contracts, which are costly to verify and enforce, and non-binding contracts, which simply rely on trust as an enforcement mechanism, in both one-shot and repeated interactions. The returns to effort appear to have an important effect on reputational behavior. The theoretical investigation […]

Jan Dalhuisen, ‘What Does the Transnationalisation of the Commercial Contract Mean? Is there a New Model and Are There Minimum Standards? Is There a Law and Economics Perspective?’

Abstract This presentation deals with the nature of the commercial contract and how it operates in the transnational commercial and financial legal order. It discusses and compares the common and civil law contract model and finds that transnationallly in professional dealings the common law model is favoured, the reason being that it derives from commercial […]

Book Review: Economic Approaches to Intellectual Property, by Nicola Searle and Martin Brassell

Abstract Intellectual property (IP) is well recognized as an important economic asset. Many companies rely heavily on their IP to contribute value to their enterprise: Apple has built an empire on its trademarked logo and branding, Coca-Cola on its secret soft drink formula, and Pfizer on its pharmaceutical patents (to name just a few). The […]

Bar-Gill and Davis, ‘(Mis)perceptions of Law in Consumer Markets’

Abstract There are good reasons to believe that consumers’ behavior is sometimes influenced by systematic misperceptions of legal norms that govern product quality. Consumers might misperceive specific rules, such as those found in food safety regulations, as well as more general standards, such as the unconscionability doctrine or limitations on waivers of default substantive or […]

Arden Rowell, ‘Once and Future Nudges’

Abstract The nudge – a form of behaviorally-informed regulation that attempts to account for people’s scarce cognitive resources – has been explosively successful at colonizing the regulatory state. This Essay argues that the remarkable success of nudges as a species creates new challenges and opportunities for individual nudges that did not exist ten years ago, […]

‘Cass Sunstein in Dublin November 10th’

“On November 10th, we welcome back the distinguished Harvard Law Professor, Cass Sunstein to Dublin. Professor Sunstein will deliver three sessions over the course of the afternoon: 1. The first session will take place from 1.30pm to 2.45pm in the UCD Geary Institute and will follow up from his recent talk on new directions in […]

Qi Zhou, ‘What Can Economists Learn from Contract Lawyers?’

Abstract This chapter aims to stimulate a debate on the role played by lawyers in law and economics scholarship. It is argued that traditional legal scholarship is unfairly undervalued in the current law and economics movement. By using examples in English contract law, this chapter argues that lawyers can make three invaluable contributions to law […]

Rumen Kostadinov, ‘Renegotiation of Long-Term Contracts with Implicit Incentives’

Abstract I study a repeated game where a principal hires a risk-averse agent through long-term contracts on output. The agent’s effort is observable but non-contractible and is a basis for a self-enforcing agreement (relational contract) between the players: after observing effort and output the principal can pay a voluntary bonus and attempt to renegotiate the […]