Category Archives: General

Čerka, Grigienė and Sirbikytė, ‘Is it possible to grant legal personality to artificial intelligence software systems?’

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to determine whether Systems of Artificial Intelligence (SAI) can be deemed subjects of law. This aim is formulated according to the technical capabilities integrated in SAI and the SAI’s ability to interact independently with other legal subjects. SAI features, such as direct connection with intellectual skills, the ability […]

Dagan and Dorfman, ‘Interpersonal Human Rights’

Abstract: Our increasingly globalized environment, typified by the significant role of transnational interactions, raises urgent concerns about the commission of grave transnational wrongs. Two main legal strategies – belonging, respectively, to public and private international law – offer important directions for addressing these urgent concerns. One strategy extends state obligations under human rights law to […]

‘Comparative Law as a Means of Legal Reasoning?’

“On the 13th of September 2017, M-EPLI had the honour of welcoming Prof Dr Thomas Coendet, the respected Swiss lawyer and current professor at KoGuan Law School in Shanghai, to give a talk on the topic of ‘Comparative Law as a Means of Legal Reasoning?’. Firstly, some insight into comparative law should be given. Comparative […]

Robin West, ‘The Contested Value of Normative Legal Scholarship’

Abstract: Legal scholarship, under attack from critics both inside and outside the legal academy, is on the horns of a ‘normativity’ dilemma. To some critics, legal scholarship isn’t scholarship, because it’s too normative; while to others, it may be scholarship, but it’s not legal because it’s not normative enough. In this article, I address one […]

Charles Barzun, ‘Justice Souter’s Common Law’

Abstract: The first-year law-school curriculum aims to teach students the ‘common-law method’. But exactly what sort of judicial reasoning that method permits and requires has long been the subject of debate. There are multiple models of common-law reasoning, not just one. This Article identifies one such model that legal scholars have yet to recognize as […]

William Bratton, ‘The Separation of Corporate Law and Social Welfare’

Abstract: A half century ago, corporate legal theory pursued an institutional vision in which corporations and the law that creates them protect people from the ravages of volatile free markets. That vision was challenged on the ground during the 1980s, when corporate legal institutions and market forces came to blows over questions concerning hostile takeovers. […]

Avihay Dorfman, ‘Private Law Exceptionalism? Part II: A Basic Difficulty with the Argument from Formal Equality’

Abstract: Contemporary discussions of private law theory often assume that parties in a private law interaction can relate as equals if, and only if, equality is cast in terms of formal equality (sometimes called transactional equality). I devote these pages to refute this conceptual view, showing that it does not draw correctly the map of […]

Jeffrey Harrison, ‘Spite: Legal and Social Implications’

Abstract: Spite is not a simple concept. The same actions may be motivated by a desire to harm others as a source of the actor’s satisfaction. They may also be a reaction to a personal sense of injustice. Finally, spite-like actions are consistent with simply righting a wrong. This Article makes the case that spite, […]

Dagan and Kreitner, ‘The Bureaucrats of Private Law’

Abstract: Theories of regulation conceptualize the task of the agencies of the modern state in terms of the public interest. Regulatory bureaucracies, in this conventional view, should ensure the efficient allocation of scarce resources and secure distributive justice and democratic citizenship. Many agencies nicely fit this collectivist mold, but not all. A significant subset of […]

Joseph Raz, ‘Can Moral Principles Change?’

Abstract: The paper considers the main arguments against the possibility that basic normative principles can change, and finds them wanting. The principal argument discussed derives from the claim that normative considerations are intelligible, and therefore that they can be explained, and their explanations presuppose the prior existence of basic normative principles. The intelligibility thesis is […]