Category Archives: Defamation and Privacy

Chico and Taylor, ‘Using and Disclosing Confidential Patient Information and the English Common Law: What are the Information Requirements of a Valid Consent?’

Abstract: The National Health Service in England and Wales is dependent upon the flow of confidential patient data. In the context of consent to the use of patient health data, insistence on the requirements of an ‘informed’ consent that are difficult to achieve will drive reliance on alternatives to consent. Here we argue that one […]

Call for Papers: Fake News and Weaponized Defamation: Global Perspectives, Southwestern Law School, Los Angeles, 26 January 2018

“… ‘Weaponized defamation’ refers to the increasing invocation, and increasing use, of defamation and privacy torts by people in power to threaten press investigations, despite laws protecting responsible or non-reckless reporting. In the United States, for example, some politicians, including the current president, invoke defamation as both a sword and shield. Armed with legal power […]

Robert Rabin, ‘Perspectives on Privacy, Data Security and Tort Law’

Abstract: The continuing problems of data breaches, data misuse, and the consequent failure of current laws to adequately deal with these problems is widely acknowledged. In this article, I provide an overview of the regulatory enforcement and information disclosure strategies for addressing the problem before turning to the main theme of the paper: An assessment […]

Morgan Cloud, ‘Property Is Privacy: Locke and Brandeis in the Twenty-First Century’

Abstract: For fifty years Katz v United States has played a central role in defining both how the Fourth Amendment regulates electronic surveillance by the government and the nature of the links between the Fourth Amendment and property rights – links established by the Amendment’s eighteenth century text. In Katz, the Supreme Court attempted to […]

Patrick O’Callaghan, ‘The Chance “to Melt into the Shadows of Obscurity”: Developing a Right to Be Forgotten in the United States’

Abstract: This chapter argues that there is some (limited) evidence of a right to be forgotten in the jurisprudence of US courts. For the purposes of this argument, the right exists whenever interests in being forgotten and/or forgetting are understood as weighty enough to impose a duty on government and/or fellow citizens to respect those […]

Giancarlo Frosio, ‘Right to Be Forgotten: Much Ado About Nothing’

Abstract: In the information society, the role of private sector entities in gathering information for and about users has long been a most critical issue. Therefore, intermediaries have become a main focus of privacy regulations, especially in jurisdictions with a strong tradition of privacy protection such as Europe. In a landmark case, the ECJ ruled […]

‘Exposing the Praxis of Comparative Law for What It Is’

Ronald J Krotoszynski, Jr, Privacy Revisited: A Global Perspective on the Right to Be Left Alone (2016). I liked Privacy Revisited, not the least because Ronald Krotoszynski’s book – both explicitly and implicitly – lays bare and grapples with comparative law’s thorniest methodological problems. It is inspiring to see a colleague struggling so honestly and […]

‘What is the literal meaning of Article 82(1) GDPR in each of the EU’s 24 official languages?’

“I’m trying to work out what Article 82(1) of the General Data Protection Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC) […]

Jessica Pollack, ‘Getting Even: Empowering Victims of Revenge Porn With a Civil Cause of Action’

Introduction: … This Note does argue, though, that because of the valid First Amendment violations present, criminalizing revenge porn is not the best method by which to seek redress against an offender, but rather, states should enact civil causes of action specifically against revenge porn. Further, this Note argues that an affirmative consent standard should […]

James Alexander, ‘Libel and Copyright in the Satire of Peter Pindar’

Abstract: In 1802, the English Chancery Court denied the satirical poet John Wolcot (‘Peter Pindar’) injunctive relief for copyright infringement claimed against his publisher John Walker. While the original agreement between the parties was ambiguous, the ruling was more procedural rather than interpretive. As Wolcot’s verse was always scandalous and arguably libelous, Eldon ruled that […]