Category Archives: Deontology and Moral Responsibility

‘Taking Utilitarianism Seriously’

Christopher Woodard, Taking Utilitarianism Seriously, Oxford University Press, 2019, 244pp, $65.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780198732624. Christopher Woodard sets himself a difficult task here. Utilitarian theories are a subset of consequentialist theories, but even many of Woodard’s fellow consequentialists take themselves to have compelling reasons to reject certain commitments distinctive of utilitarian forms of consequentialism. They have […]

Recently published: Civil Wrongs and Justice in Private Law (Miller and Oberdiek eds)

Introduction (Paul B Miller and John Oberdiek) Chapter 1: The Roles of Rights (David Owens) Chapter 2: Purely Formal Wrongs (Liam B Murphy) Chapter 3: The Relevance of Wrongs (Andrew S Gold) Chapter 4: The Remainder: Deserting Private Wrongs? (Ori Herstein) Chapter 5: Civil Wrongs and Civil Procedure (Matthew A Shapiro) Chapter 6: Losing the […]

Timmermann and Viebahn, ‘To lie or to mislead?’

ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is to argue that lying differs from mere misleading in a way that can be morally relevant: liars commit themselves to something they believe to be false, while misleaders avoid such commitment, and this difference can make a moral difference. Even holding all else fixed, a lie can therefore […]

Stephen Bero, ‘Holding Responsible and Taking Responsibility’

ABSTRACT In matters of responsibility, there are often two sides to the transaction: one party who holds another responsible, and the other who (ideally) takes responsibility for her conduct. The first side has been closely scrutinized in discussions of the nature of responsibility, due to the influential Strawsonian conjecture that an agent is responsible if […]

‘Legal Theory Bookworm: Group Duties by Collins’

“The Legal Theory Bookworm recommends Group Duties: Their Existence and Their Implications for Individuals by Stephanie Collins. Here is a description …” (more) [Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Blog, 23 May]

Cass Sunstein, ‘On the Wrongness of Lies’

ABSTRACT Why are lies wrong? The Kantian answer sees lies as a close cousin to coercion; they are a violation of individual autonomy and a demonstration of contempt. By contrast, the utilitarian answer is that lies are likely to lead to terrible consequences, sometimes because they obliterate trust, sometime because they substitute the liar’s will […]

Angela Ballantyne, ‘How should we think about clinical data ownership?’

ABSTRACT The concept of ‘ownership’ is increasingly central to debates, in the media, health policy and bioethics, about the appropriate management of clinical data. I argue that the language of ownership acts as a metaphor and reflects multiple concerns about current data use and the disenfranchisement of citizens and collectives in the existing data ecosystem. […]

Group Duties: Their Existence and Implications for Individuals

“Stephanie Collins, Group Duties: Their Existence and Implications for Individuals, Oxford University Press, 2019, 218pp, $65.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780198840275. As Stephanie Collins notes in the opening lines of her book, we (as philosophers, but also as members of political, civic, religious and other communities) frequently assume that groups can have moral responsibilities. In her extraordinarily […]

David Enoch, ‘False Consciousness for Liberals, Part I: Consent, Autonomy, and Adaptive Preferences’

ABSTRACT The starting point regarding consent has to be that it is both extremely important, and that it is often suspicious. In this article, the author tries to make sense of both of these claims, from a largely liberal perspective, tying consent, predictably, to the value of autonomy and distinguishing between autonomy as sovereignty and […]

Jeffrey Brown, ‘What Makes Disability Discrimination Wrong?’

INTRODUCTION … In this paper, I aim to connect the rich literature on what makes discrimination wrong to disability law and policy’s reasonable accommodation requirements. Specifically, I argue that disability discrimination, ie, a failure to provide reasonable accommodations, is wrongful when and because it violates the principles of relational equality. One vital concern for relational […]